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« The tell-tale heart of political science : literal vs. metaphorical use of 
narrative in analysing power relations » 
 





Judging by their current uses in policy analysis, the merits of notions such as 
‘policy narrative’ and ‘meta-narrative’ seem to reside more in their evocative or 
suggestive character than in any capacity to “tell a story”. Narratives constructed 
by political scientists mostly have a representational content that bears little 
similarity with what narratology as a discipline studies. Breaking up with this 
metaphorical use, we propose to take the storytelling dimension of policy 
narrative more seriously, ie. more literally. Though narratives proved useful in 
understanding the articulation of discursive patterns and power struggles in 
policy processes, we think it paradoxically failed to provide a consistent analysis 
of what is at stake when agents and institutions get “entangled in stories” (to take 
the expression of German phenomenologist Wilhelm Schapp). What would 
happen to policy narratives if, according to the strictly technical, narratological 
sense of the word, we suddenly turned actors and agents into “characters”, who 
get transformed through a series of trials and tests? Similarly, if we restored the 
notion of perspective (what narratologists call ‘focalization’), what would be the 
consequence for the policy analyst to be envisaged as a narrator?  
In our paper, we propose to confront literal and metaphorical uses of narratives in 
analyzing power relations. We suggest that both frames of analysis are actually 
complementary: once explored and revisited as ‘narratives’ in either use of the 
word, concepts of ‘innovation’, ‘development’ and ‘modernity’ already appear to 





In our paper, we propose to focus on the concept of narrative and the way it has 
been used so far in political science, especially in policy studies. We will refer to 
narratology as a scientific discipline to stress a more literal approach to 
narratives than the one followed by most policy analysts who, as we understand 
it, only address a rather metaphorical notion of narrative. We insist on the fact 
that this should not downplay the relevance of a metaphorical approach to 
narratives, but rather be thought of in a complementary way. To that extent, the 
notion of “pathway” will help us introduce open-endedness and a multi-level 
dimension in metaphorical narration.  
 
The contribution we would like to bring is twofold. First, we intend to complete the                                                         1 This communication was made possible with the support of the University of Liège (missions scientifiques du Patrimoine) and of the FNRS. 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policy analyst’s methodological toolkit by taking into account the power 
dimension of narratives. Second, we believe that, even at a metaphorical level, 
bringing together policy analysis and narratology not only clarifies the notion of 
narrative we usually refer to but, more importantly, also has a normative self-
reflexivity component: we as policy analysts should be careful when we behave 
as if agents were telling each other stories. Instead, we shall acknowledge our 
own structuring role in putting together the representational elements of policy-
making and turning them into “narratives”. It is within such a broader 
conceptualization, so our argument goes, that will it be possible to consider 
narratives not as a mere instrument of power, but as the heart of its distribution. 
 
Although it originates from literary theory (Eco 1979; Genette, 1979; Van Dijk, 
1975; Citton 2010), the power of narratives in shaping beliefs and actions is 
today supported in a variety of academic research fields including policy studies 
(e.g. Fischer, 2003; Stone, 2003; Roe, 1994; Jones and McBeth 2010) 
communications (e.g., McComas & Shanahan, 1999), marketing (e.g., Mattila, 
2000), neuroscience (e.g., Ash et al., 2007), psychology (e.g., Gerrig & Egidi, 
2003), sociology (e.g. Latour, 2003; Claisse and Delvenne 2011) or science and 
technology studies (e.g. Delvenne and Rip, 2011). These disciplines usually 
study narratives as an empirical concept, using traditional methodologies to build 
explanatory theories of narratives.  
 
Yet despite the apparent power of narratives in shaping arguments, discourse 
and reality, we agree with Jones and Mc Beth’s diagnosis (2010, p. 330) when 
they consider that “policy studies, although significant steps were taken by the 
postpositivist school of public policy, have largely remained on the sidelines of 
the empirical study of narratives, failing to provide methodological alternatives to 
the study of narratives”2. In this contribution, we will suggest that narratology can 
bring up additional clarity, constructive formalism and fresh conceptual rigor to 
policy analysis. Policy studies have often discussed narratives in an instrumental 
way, turning them into strategic tools used by actors struggling for power. This 
creates some particular issues that the present paper claims to address. Indeed, 
it is important to recall that policy narratives are not narratives per se: they are 
transformed into narratives by the analyst whose task is to order the social world 
by attributing meaning and making sense of reality. Most of the time, however, 
policy studies have tended to ignore the existence of various narrative levels, 
which created misleading assumptions about the almost intrinsic power of 
narratives (e.g. Radaelli, 2000a). In the literature, for instance Bridgman and 
Barry (2002), who use and expand on Emery Roe’s (1994) narrative policy                                                         2 Jones and McBeth define a narrative as “a story with a temporal sequence of events unfolding 
in a plot that is populated by dramatic moments, symbols, and archetypal characters that 
culminates in a moral to the story. Narrative, understood here as both a particular category of 
communication and a method of cognitive organization, functions as a seemingly universal device 
for individuals to sharpen certain elements of reality while levelling others. Indeed, there is 
increasingly persuasive empirical evidence to support such a claim as narrative is found to be a 
primary means by which individuals organize, process, and convey information. In fact, narrative 
cognition may be fundamental to a meaningful human existence” (2010: 329-330). 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analysis framework, metaphors are emphasized because they seemingly 
embody “narratives” and “counternarratives”.  
 
However, when referred to in this way, narratives have a representational content 
that bears little similarity with what narratology as a discipline studies. As a 
provocative way of putting it, one could say that there is no narrative in a policy 
narrative. At best, one can argue that there are shared repertoires or storylines 
but the role of the policy analyst — giving account of the actors’ narrative 
accounts — is rather puzzling for understanding who is telling whose story. 
Breaking up with this metaphorical use, we propose to take the storytelling 
dimension of policy narrative more seriously, ie. more literally. Though narratives 
proved useful in understanding the articulation of discursive patterns and power 
struggles in policy processes, we think it paradoxically failed to provide a 
consistent analysis of what is at stake when agents and institutions get 
“entangled in stories” (to take the expression of German phenomenologist 
Wilhelm Schapp). What would happen to policy narratives if, according to the 
strictly technical, narratological sense of the word, we suddenly turned actors and 
agents into “characters” who get transformed through a series of trials and tests? 
Similarly, if we restored the notion of perspective (what narratologists call 
‘focalization’), what would be the consequence for the policy analyst to be 
envisaged as a narrator? 
 
In our contribution, we propose to confront literal and metaphorical uses of 
narratives in analyzing power relations. We suggest that both frames of analysis 
are actually complementary: once explored and revisited as ‘narratives’ in either 
use of the word, concepts such as ‘innovation’, ‘development’ and ‘modernity’ 




Innovation for development and the golden Eden of Modernity 
 
All over the world, science, technology and innovation policies and strategic 
plans integrate and reproduce the narrative of innovation for development 
through economic growth, using concepts such as « national systems of 
innovation » (Lundvall, 1992) or « knowledge society/economy ». Even when 
such a model of innovation was not ideal or unadapted for local realities, it has 
been put forward again and again by international institutions such as the World 
Bank, the Interamerican Bank for Development or the International Monetary 
Fund. The equation at the heart of the narrative has always been the same: 
fostering innovation — thus investing in order to strengthen its place in the 
national economy — should unavoidably lead to further economic benefits that 
should ultimately help improve the level of social welfare. As a matter of fact, 
national systems of innovation theoretically exist wherever innovation is 
performed. Making the system come true and be efficient sounds like a 
precondition for competitiveness and further development. However, in reality, 
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those systems merely exist in most developing countries who use it a legitimation 
discourse for activities that cannot actually take place because of economic 
dependence to the global North, lack of resources and wide social inequalities. 
Importantly, pretending to take the « knowledge society pathway » seriously, e.g. 
by establishing an institutional structure for a national system of innovation, 
becomes the motor of further public policies funding. 
 
When innovation is finally performed, it thus means that power has been 
unequally distributed amongst a number of actors that took part, in one way or 
another, to a complex systemic process including natural resources extraction, 
fundamental and applied research, industrial applications and economic 
competitiveness leading to further benefits. Such a process implied an active 
participation of stakeholders who confronted various lines of arguments, 
discursive resources, economic visions and socio-political priorities. Most of the 
time, when developing countries embraced the narrative of innovation for 
development, they somehow fell victim of a dominant narrative which is actually 
entrenched in or somehow related to an hegemonic structure (Radaelli, 2000), a 
consistent pattern that reflects the coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000).  
 
Inspired by Beck and Lau’s idea of “patterns of meta-change” (2005, 529), we 
propose the notion of “pathways” of development (specifically, in this case, the 
pathway of “innovation for economic and social improvement”) to introduce open-
endedness in metaphorical narration. “Pathways” are understood here, as the 
Oxford English Dictionary phrases it: “a sequence of changes or events 
constituting a progression.” What the “progression” is needs not be specified 
beforehand. Pathways are open-ended and have to be reconstructed by taking 
their open-endedness into account3. 
 
A further analytical step is to locate such a pathway empirically. And this is where 
the narratives come in. It is indeed possible to point out a patchwork of actual or 
potential master narrative strands and overall socio-political constellations at the 
macro level (what Roe would call a metanarrative) which have an impact on 
institutions, affecting their functioning and influencing the practices of actors. In 
some historical periods, an evolving master narrative can be identified (like the 
one we just outlined) which creates discursive order and has an effect on 
institutions and practices. Thus, the macro-level patchwork acts as a backdrop to 
institutions and interactions at meso level, but is also the outcome of such 
interactions. When there is some stabilization a reversal occurs and the macro 
level shapes the meso level, at least for a time. Since institutions and practices 
have their own dynamics as well they will never be completely captured and 
shaped by a master narrative.  
                                                         
3 The notion of pathway is discussed in broader detail in Delvenne (2011), who discusses 
reflexive modernization in general, and in Delvenne and Rip (2011), who suggest a methodology 
for tracing pathways of science and technology institutions under conditions of reflexive 
modernization. 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The tentative justifications offered by the actors in the “innovation for 
development” pathway are located at the macro-level, but the pathway is created 
and supported at the meso-level of institutions and corporate actors (in the 
sense of Coleman, 1990), including civil society organisations. Such pathways 
are not given, just inviting actors to follow them. They are open-ended and co-
constructed. Actors pursuing open-ended paths will introduce notions of more or 
less desirable directions that will shape discussion and action. Experiences of 
reactions and outcomes, and the reflection on what happens, will go into the 
combination of actual evolutions and projections of desirable directions.  
 
A concrete instance of a narrative taking a life on its own and to some extent 
becoming an external force exerting a pressure on actors and institutions is the 
narrative of Modernity since the 18th century. For the sake of helping so-called 
« developing », « less advanced », « underdeveloped » or « traditional » 
countries to reach the golden Eden of Modernity, political decisions are being 
taken everyday at the highest decisional level by respectable international 
institutions. As we have just explained, it is evident that those political decisions 
influence the design of public policies in developing countries. We underlined that 
these decisions were not neutral because they primarily serve the interests of 
more developed (mostly Western) countries. However, it is difficult to argue that 
international public officials do engage in narratives for advancing the Modern 
project. But the analyst might say they do, even though unconsciously, because 
they are embedded in power structures where projections and attempts at 
anticipation occur all the time.  
 
Where does the particular salience of the narrative of Modernity come from? One 
explanation can be given by referring to an asymmetrical importance and visibility 
of two separate sociological traditions. The first one is Eurocentric, hegemonic in 
the way it frames the Modern project and its claims to universality. This tradition 
considers modernity as a set of European phenomena that first developed in 
Europe before spreading out to other parts of the world which were — and still 
are — by definition or by opposition traditional, primitive, less advanced, 
underdeveloped. Ulrick Beck and Anthony Giddens stand for influential authors in 
this trend of thought. For example, Giddens inaugurates his book The 
Consequences of Modernity (1990, 1-3) by stating that “modernity refers to 
modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe and that sociology 
is a study of that modern social life” (our emphasis).  
 
As Beck and Grande (2010) acknowledge: 
 
This […] encouraged the denigration of […] colonized societies, which were 
widely perceived as inferior and backward compared to their European and 
American counterparts (‘traditional’). Many theories of modernity have 
consequently drawn on a very narrow range of national experiences (e.g. 
England/Britain in the economic realm, France in the political domain and 
Prussia/Germany in the field of bureaucracy), which are presumed to be 
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universally valid or, at the very least, a model to be replicated in other 
regions of the globe (412). 
 
Further in the same article, Beck and Grande (2010) even confess that: 
 
In its initial formulation (see, e.g., Beck 1992; Beck, Giddens and Lash 
1994), the theory of reflexive modernization was very much a theory of 
‘Western’ modernity itself. It shared a number of basic assumptions with 
traditional theories of modernity and modernization. Among others, it had 
the same universalist aspiration, i.e. it assumed that its norms, principles 
and institutions could (and should) be applied (sooner or later) throughout 
the globe. This idea must be revised and replaced by the idea of 
‘cosmopolitan modernities’ (416).  
 
Nevertheless, from a Euramerican point of view, this remains the main visible line 
of academic thinking of modernity if one looks at what can be found in libraries as 
well as in high impact peer-reviewed articles in scientific journals.  
 
The second, less visible, sociological tradition of modernity is driven by authors 
from the “global South” (e.g. Quijano, 2000; Lee, 2008; Patel, 2010; Randeria, 
2002) who heavily rely on a research programme whose aim is to unfold the 
history of modernity in order to reconstruct the way it has been presented again 
and again by the victors (the dominators), in science, literature or in the 
classrooms. Although these authors (mostly neo-marxists and post-structuralists) 
remain marginal in high impact peer-reviewed scientific journal, their important 
points address modernity as a hegemonic process that does not clearly assume 
itself because it systematically tones down the question of power. Historical 
power but also — importantly for our purpose — actual power exerted by the 
beneficiaries of Westernized modernity. However, they stress that coloniality 
(Quijano) or indigenity (Patel) are crucial concepts to understand the current 
balance of powers in a world dominated by small set of countries belonging to 
the “global North”. 
 
Until his recent publication with Edgar Grande, Ulrich Beck never stopped 
presenting reflexive modernization as a linear process, continuing to push 
forward the latest developments of the Western modern project. In this vein, 
interconnectivity and global dynamics are said to render to world so complex that 
modern achievements, capitalism and supranational cooperation along the lines 
defined by international institutions are key to ensure good governance in the 21st 
century.  
 
Eisenstadt’s attempt at coining the term “multiple modernities” (2000) is an 
important achievement in the direction of equitable and possibly more “socially 
fair” social science. However, as underlined by Patel (2010), he is mainly 
convincing in demonstrating how several modernities could develop and follow 
separate historical trajectories, almost separately from one another. The next 
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important step (for us, for social science, for the Modern project) is to provide 
evidence as to how those various modern trajectories have actually been 
interacting along the lines of processes of domination by a few on many others. 
In other words, we need to tend towards the study of a variety of pathways 
towards different interconnected modernities. 
 
 
Towards a literal approach to narrativity 
 
The notion of pathway we presented in the previous section in order to describe 
multi-level sequences of actions in macro-processes such as innovation, 
development or Modernity is in itself no less metaphorical than the notion of 
narrative. It doesn’t “tell any story”: it has been designed to organize and 
structure heterogeneous sets of representations and discourse. But it has at least 
the merit of open-endedness, whereas Roe repeatedly (and minimally) defined a 
narrative as something that must have “a beginning, a middle and an end” (1992: 
563). Not having an end is even, according to Roe, a distinctive feature of a 
nonstory. Yet, most actors engaged in a course of action are capable of 
elaborating several storylines regarding “what could happen next”, even if they 
don’t know for sure what exactly is going to happen. They have the ability to 
imagine alternatives; they have expectations, desires and cognitions that are 
oriented toward the future, even if that future is unknown or uncertain. These 
open-ended routine activities of interpretation match the definition of a narrative 
in a much better way that Roe’s criteria. 
 
Anticipation and possibility are also central to the cognitive activities involved in 
telling, reading or listening to a story. When interpreting a story, the reader 
establishes a complex relationship with the text that combines synthesizing and 
forecasting: even if the reader doesn’t know the end of the story, he or she 
develops, in cooperation with the text, strategies of interpretation that clear paths 
among the possible worlds made accessible by the narrative. As a result, the 
lack of an ending is not determinant to discriminate between candidates for a 
story: even better, it is precisely how narratives are meant to function. From the 
agent or the reader point of view, any sequence of action can be described as a 
story regardless of whether it has reached completion or not. “What happens 
next?” is the pivotal question any reader has got to ask himself when confronted 
to an unfolding story. The criteria used by Roe to build the notion of policy 
narrative seem to miss that key feature. 
 
Incidentally, Deborah Stone uses approximately the same criteria to define what 
a narrative structure is: "Definitions of policy problems usually have narrative 
structure; that is, they are stories with a beginning, middle, and an end, involving 
some change or transformation. They have heroes and villains and innocent 
victims, and they pit forces of evil against forces of good.” (2002: 138) 
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If stories are not something that, as Roe or Stone put it roughly, have 
“beginnings, middles and ends”, then how could we improve that definition? In 
Lector in Fabula, Italian semiotician Umberto Eco tries to determine the basic 
elements of a narrative sequence. He starts by summarizing a series of 
conditions proposed by Dutch narrative theorist Teun van Dijk (1975). According 
to the latter: 
“A narration is a description of actions that requires, for each action 
described, an agent, an intention of the agent, a state or possible world, a 
change, along with the cause or the point that determines that change; 
one could add mental states, emotions, circumstances to that; but 
description is critical (…) if the described actions are difficult and only if 
the agent does not have an obvious choice as to the course of action to 
take in order to change the state that doesn’t correspond to his own 
desires; the events that ensue from that decision have to be unexpected, 
and some of them must appear unusual or strange.” (1985: 137, our 
translation). 
 
The most important elements here for the purpose of our communication are the 
notions of possible world, of state changes and of mental states. Indeed, as we 
shall develop in the last section of our paper, these elements are also distinctive 
components of modern (re)definitions of power, so that power and narrative 
should be thought together, as mutually embedded social constructs rather than 
two separate phenomena. 
 
For now, if we take a closer look at van Dijk’s definition of narrative found in 
Eco’s work, we could say it bears some similarities with Stone’s attempt (except 
for the lack of reference to beginnings, middles and ends), especially in the last 
elements. But Eco immediately minimizes the importance of these elements that 
emphasize “difficulties” and “unusual” events, discarding them as “excessive” for 
a general definition of narrative. He then simply goes back to Aristotle’s Poetics 
to limit the prerequisites of a narrative to a shorter list comprising:  
 
“An agent (be it human or not); an initial state; a series of changes 
oriented in time and produced by causes (which do not have to be 
specified at all cost); until a final result is reached (be it transitory or 
interlocutory).” (1985: 138, our translation) 
 
This definition is now opened enough to allow Eco to identify a narrative level 
even in short segments and utterances of texts that do not appear as narrative at 
first sight - for example, the detailed chemical procedure required to produce 
lithium, or the definition of substance at the beginning of Spinoza’s Ethics: 
 
“By substance, I mean that which exists in itself, and is conceived through 
itself; in other words, that of which the concept does not need the concept 




Eco claims that this definition contains at least two embedded fabulas (which can 
be defined as basic narrative units): in a first fabula, an agent achieves an action 
of signifying or meaning and, doing so, passes from a state of confused 
knowledge to a state of clearer knowledge about what God is. But there is a 
second fabula behind the first one, provided we understand the verb “I mean” 
(latin intelligo) as a genuine act of institution: if we do so, we understand that, 
through his own act of definition of God, the agent institutes his own object as a 
cultural unit, literally making it be. In the first fabula, God is not modified by the 
action of the agent; in the second one, he is instituted as an object. Yet, it would 
seem that nothing happens in the definition. Eco is aware that he chose a 
borderline example, but it is precisely the point: Spinoza’s definition is obviously 
not satisfactory as an adventure novel, but it sort of gives a “zero degree” for 
narrativity. Far from being a “nonstory” in Roe’s sense, this fabula found 
countless “Model Readers”, as Eco puts it, capable of enough textual 
cooperation to experience the kind of metaphysical emotion it encapsulates. 
 
Now that we rephrased the notion of narrative so that it goes beyond the basic 
feature of having “beginnings, middles and ends”, we can face another problem 
in the most common definition of policy narratives. As we suggested in the first 
section of our paper, there is no “real” narrative in policy narratives, just like there 
is no real “pathways” of development or innovation: narratives are a mere 
conceptual tool used by the analyst to give account and make sense of the way 
agents make themselves sense of their actions. In ethnomethodological terms, 
one could say it is an “account of accounts”, adopting the form of a narrative as a 
particular “ethnomethod”4. The policy analyst behaves as if agents were telling 
each other stories, but he or she is actually the one who puts the elements 
together and builds the macrostructure of the metanarrative. As a second degree 
elaboration, it has the good points and downsides of a metaphor. 
 
There is no denying that narratives do help policy makers structure their 
environment and so reduce uncertainty and complexity, certifying and stabilizing 
the hypotheses necessary to decision making. But the same goes all the more 
for the policy analyst, who also uses narratives to structure otherwise conflicting 
representations and perspectives. Roe develops powerful “metanarratives” that 
in turn inform policy makers of their own representations, which in the end, in the 
best-case scenario, fosters a mutual learning process and encourages the 
search for consensus.  
 
This should not be a problem if the analyst kept a clear distinction of who does 
what in the process. But the notion of policy narrative actually mixes up different 
levels that, in our view, should remain distinct and would do so if we adopted a 
more literal take on narrativity. On what level exactly would be a “dominant policy 
narrative”? Is it:                                                         4 That is: “a shared method used by members of society to mutually construct the meaningful 
orderliness of social situations” (Anne Warfield Rawls, in Garfinkel, 2002: 5). 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- The very sequence of actions, the “content” of the narrative, so to speak – for 
example, what we get when we extract a fabula from a segment of text, just like 
Eco did with Spinoza’s definition of substance? This is what narratology bluntly 
calls the story, or the diegesis (see Genette, 1980). With Roe’s focus on 
structures and pure contents of narratives, this should be the most natural level 
at which dominant policy narratives operate. This is also the level of Deborah 
Stone’s “causal stories”, which correspond to general patterns of stories implying 
different ways of attributing causality and responsability; 
 
- But it could also be the narrative itself of that sequence, that is, the very words 
by which Spinoza ordered that sequence of actions — the oral or written 
discourse in charge of “telling the story”. Confusingly, and although policy 
narratives are mainly a convenient metaphor, this is also the level at which some 
analysts seem to locate dominant narratives. Radaelli, for example, insists that 
policy narratives do not “float in the air” (2000b: 262) and have to be backed up 
by institutions in order to be fully efficient as components of a cognitive structure 
– which is another way to say that stories have first to be told in order to be 
heard. Undoubtedly, to think otherwise would amount to succumbing to some 
kind of idealistic bias. But the confusion remains – all the more since the reader 
often has little information as to the basic material used by the analyst 
(interviews, statements, reports, …); 
 
- Finally, the third and last narrative level is the narrative act itself as a speech 
act, the narration. As any speech act, narrations have perlocutionary effects that 
can indeed be very powerful: narratives can persuade, scare, inform, enlighten, 
entertain, and in general get someone to do something he would not have done 
otherwise. These effects have also been acknowledged as they should by policy 
analysts. Radaelli (2000b), to quote him again, reminds us that hegemonic 
narratives are powerful not only for what they say, but for what they do – and 
what they do best is perhaps to reduce rival or alternative narratives to silence. 
 
Narratology’s task as a subdiscipline of linguistics is to study the relationships 
between these three levels (story, narrative and narration), in terms of: 
- frequency (the possibilities allowed by the separation between an event and its 
narration); 
- duration (leading to a difference between narrative time and discourse time); 
- voice (who narrates and from where? In short, narration can be from inside or 
from outside the text, and the narrator can be a character within the story or not); 
- and mode, which is a matter of distance and perspective of the narrator, that is 
a problem of focalisation. 
 
However, as we could see, these three levels are often mixed up by policy 
analysts, and their articulations never studied – not surprisingly, since, for the 
most part, there are no real utterances of narratives to begin with. Even at a 
metaphorical level, we believe these distinctions should help us policy analysts 
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not only clarify the notion of narrative we refer to, but, more importantly, identify 
ourselves as “ghost narrators” in the policy narratives machine. 
 
 
Narratives and counter-narratives 
 
Another way of exploring more literal uses of the notion of narrative in policy 
studies would be to follow the recent suggestions made by French literary and 
political theorist Yves Citton in a short essay entitled Mythocracy (2010). Citton 
tries to understand the growing hold that storytelling as a new marketing 
paradigm came to have on our daily lives: nowadays, it would seem that 
everybody has a story to tell, and especially that everybody who has something 
to sell can’t do so without telling a story about it (Salmon, 2010). This pervasive 
“power” of narratives in the most trivial sense of the word led Citton to analyze 
the relations between power and narratives more deeply, with the purpose of 
building efficient “counter-narratives” that would be at least as powerful as the 
ones developed by marketers.  
 
Citton points out a deep-level homology between narratives as narratology 
analyzes them and Foucault’s definition of power. In one of his last papers, “The 
Subject of Power”, where he tried to return to and expand on his underlying 
conception of power in his work, Foucault gave indeed some of his most 
insightful definitions of what power is about: 
 
It is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it 
incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the 
extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way 
of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting 
or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions.” (1982: 
789) 
 
The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and 
putting in order the possible outcome. (1982: 790) 
 
To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of 
others. (1982: 790) 
 
This is where Citton found some kind of homology between power and the way 
narrative functions. His own definition of the notion, though more minimalistic 
than the ones we commented on earlier in our paper, continues the trend: “a 
narrative is the relation [ie. the act of narrating] of transformation of states 
affecting the connection of a certain subject with a certain object” (Citton, 2010: 
70, our translation). One could say Citton’s approach of narrative and power is 
just as metaphorical as Roe’s since it is based on a purely analogical line of 
reasoning. The difference resides in the underlying conception of narrative, which 
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is, in itself, more literal than the narrative at stake in “policy narratives”, and more 
faithful to the narratological tradition.  
 
Foucault was actually not the first to break up with the common-sense 
conception of power as a substance or an attribute. Not necessarily going back 
to Robert Dahl’s classical definition of power as the capacity of A to “get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do”, (Dahl, 1957: 202-203), we can locate 
a similar shift to a relational conception of power in disciplines as different as 
sociology of organizations, cybernetics or theory of information-system. For 
example, this is how Daniel Dennett defines a relation of control: 
 
“A controls B if and only if the relation between A and B is such that A can 
drive B into whichever of B’s normal range of states A wants B to be in.” 
(Dennett, 2002: 52) 
 
In other words, it is possible to generalize Citton’s suggestion that power and 
narratives share a set of basic components : 
 
• first, they both imply a transformation of states : a relation of power 
between A and B constitutes an embryo of actantial model; 
 
• second, they both unfold in time: there is always a time interval between 
A’s action and B’s response, and B’s response is anything but mechanical. 
As Citton says, there is a “writing phase”, in which A “scenarises” B’s 
action, thoughts, desires, cognitions or behaviour, and a “completion 
phase” continuously unfolding, allowing for improvisation and permanent 
readjustments; 
 
• third, what Foucault said of power “guiding the possibility of conduct” can 
also be said of narrative. Power and narrative are two ways of structuring 
a field of possibilities, and possible world semantics apply in power 
relations the same way it does in narratives. The transformation of B’s 
states implies a multiplicity of possible states B could be in. A’s effort 
consists in reducing this field to the states he wishes B to be in. This is 
particularly obvious in Foucault’s and Dennett’s definition, but it is also the 
case with Erhard Friedberg’s sociological definition of power as the 
“unbalanced exchange of possibilities of action between a set of individual 
and/or collective actors” (1997: 123, our translation); 
 
• fourth, power implies something of a perspective or focalisation, a 
narrative “point of view”. A and B each have their own internal point of 
view on their respective possibilities of action, just as they have their own 
cognitive and affective states. The story can be told from either point of 




• fifth, this means that the distribution of possibilities of actions between A 
and B also distributes something like narrative or diegetic levels. The aim 
of A, in any power relation, is to “scenarise” B’s action, to write his/her 
story, to impact his/her narrative world. But B tries to do the same to A in 
return: even if asymmetrical, this relation also has an element of 
reciprocity. Depending on his margin of manoeuvre, B can counter-
scenarise A and try to modify his/her narrative actual and possible worlds 
in retaliation. 
 
Let us now recapitulate these points. Transformation of states; actantial model; 
relation to time; interval between a “writing” and a “completion” phase; relation to 
possibility and possible worlds; focalisation and narrative levels: all these minimal 
elements which, as we just saw, are necessary components of a narrative are 
also involved in power. One could say that agents are constantly busy trying to 
control each other, and that this form of control, in Yves Citton’s terms, amounts 
to scenarising the actions of other agents. “What’s the story I’m in?” can be 
translated in: “Who is currently telling my story?”, “Whose story am I involved 
in?”. A controls B insofar as s/he can scenarise his/her course of action. In the 
same way, A can be led to modify his or her narration because of B’s attempts at 
counter-scenarisation. 
 
As a result, there is actually no such thing as “power of narratives”. Narratives 
are not some kind of cognitive resource that would supplement pre-existent 
relations of power. Whenever we are confronted to relations characterised by 
unbalances of possibilities of action, we are likely to see activities of 
scenarisation and counter-scenarisation. Narratives are not to be found at the 
margin of power, but at its core.  
 
 
Conclusion: bridging the gap between policy analysis and narrative theory 
 
As we are reaching the conclusions, we would like to restate an important point. 
Our purpose was not to disqualify the use of narrative in policy narratives for 
being “too metaphorical”. We think the notion helped emphasize essential and 
otherwise hidden cognitive dimensions of the policy making process. After all, in 
the first part of our paper dedicated to pathways of development, we also used 
narratives in a metaphorical manner. Our point is that narratology could help 
policy studies clarify what is at stake in narratives and avoid the pitfalls and 
confusions inherent to the multi-level character of the narrative phenomenon.  
 
At the end of his article published in New Literary History in 1992, Emery Roe 
spoke in favor of new synergies between policy analysis, social science and 
humanities. His pedagogical scenario was to establish “joint degree programs 
leading to a specialisation in applied narrative analysis” (1992: 575). This 
program would of course include microeconomics, statistics, Law, organization 
theory, but also modules introducing the student to literary and cultural criticism. 
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As Roe says, policy analysts are bound to be amateurs in the specific disciplines 
that make up policy analysis, and specialists in cross-disciplinary work. 
Narratology appears to be just one of these specific disciplines policy analysts 
come across when analyzing public policies.  
 
In other words, the narratological distinctions we reminded here could only 
strengthen the notion of policy narrative and broaden the range of its possible 
applications. There would be nothing worse than calling the “metaphor police” to 
exclude policy narratives from consideration because they would not be “faithful 
enough” to the notion initially developed in its source discipline. We have nothing 
to object to conceptual nomadism and hybridation. Our intention in this 
communication has been to follow Roe’s invitation to bridge the gap between 
policy analysis and literary theory.  
 
Moreover, a notion like scenarisation shows another homology, maybe more 
fundamental, between power and narratives. If Yves Citton is right, to control a 
person’s behavior amounts to scenarise that person’s possible actions as well as 
the states that person could be in. Relations of power and activities of plot setting 
could then be considered synonymous. If this homology works, it would mean 
that the place of narratives in our discipline is actually even more central than we 
imagined: to quote the title of Edgar Poe’s short-story, there could be a “tell-tale 
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